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Summary 
We contribute to the empirical literature on the effect of government spending 
on economic activity, by assessing the impact of changes in government spending-GDP 
ratio on (the short-term growth rates of) private consumption and investment. We do 
this by analysing a panel sample of 145 countries from 1960 to 2007. The results of our 
paper suggest that government spending produces important crowding-out effects, by 
negatively affecting both private consumption and investment. The result is broadly 
robust to both country and time effects, and different econometric specifications. In 
addition, we show that the effect of government consumption on private consumption 
and investment does not depend on the phase of the business cycle, but differs 
substantially among regions. The differentiated effects of government consumption on 
private consumption and investment among geographical areas are extremely important 
and need to be further investigated. In particular, it would be interesting to assess to 
which extent the effect of government spending on consumption and investment 
depends on political and institutional variables (e.g. democracy, corruption, political 
stability) as well as macroeconomic variables (income, interest rates, degree of 
openness). We leave this challenging avenue for future research. 
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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of government spending on the private 
sector, assessing the existence of crowding-out versus crowding-in effects. Using a 
panel of 145 countries from 1960 to 2007, the results suggest that government spending 
produces important crowding-out effects, by negatively affecting both private 
consumption and investment. Moreover, while the effects do not seem to depend on the 
different phases of economic cycle, they vary considerably among regions. The results 
are economically and statistically significant, and robust to several econometric 
techniques.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The theoretical and empirical literature has provided in the last year extensive 
analysis on the effect of government spending on economic activity. Despite this, there 
is no consensus on the effects of government spending on private consumption and 
investment (both in the short and in the long term) neither from a theoretical nor from 
an empirical point of view. 
Indeed, from a theoretical perspective, the effect of an increase of government 
spending on those variables can be of both signs. The Real Business Cycle (RBC) 
model predicts a decline in private consumption in response to a rise in government 
spending: with infinitely-lived Ricardian households, an increase in government 
spending lowers the present value of after-tax income, and thus generates a negative 
wealth effect on consumption (Aiyagari et al., 1990; Baxter and King, 1993; Christiano 
and Eichenbaum, 1992). In contrast, the IS-LM model predicts that consumption should 
rise in response to a positive government spending shock: when consumers behave in a 
non-Ricardian fashion, their consumption is a function of their current disposable 
income, thus an increase in income will generate an increase in private consumption 
(Blanchard, 2001). 
Similarly to consumption, the two theories also predict different outcomes for 
investment. The RBC model claims that an increase of government consumption will 
have a positive effect on investment: an increase of government consumption induces a 
rise in employment which, if sufficiently persistent, leads to a rise in the expected return 
to capital and, therefore, may trigger a rise in investment. On the contrary, the IS-LM 
model predicts that investment should decline in response to a positive government 
spending shock: an increase in government consumption (if not followed by an 
accommodating increase of money supply) leads to an increase in the interest rate, 
which in turn will translate into a decrease in investment. 
From this discussion it emerges that the predictions of the above mentioned 
theories are orthogonal to each other. These contrasting views gave rise to several 
empirical studies attempting to assess the impact of public expenditures on consumption 
and private investment. Unfortunately, the predictions of the empirical evidence are also 
quite mixed in support of one theory or the other as can be seen from Table 1 .  
The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to the empirical literature by 
analyzing the impact of changes in government spending on private consumption and 
investment. By doing this, we provide an additional test on whether government 
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spending generates "crowding-out" or "crowding-in" effects on the private sector. In 
addition, we can also discriminate between the standard RBC and IS-LM model. 
While most of the tests of the “crowding-out” versus “crowding-in” hypothesis 
that have been carried in previous papers focus on a time series or cross-country 
approach, this work extends such analysis to a panel data set of 145 countries from 1960 
to 2007.
1
  
The results show that government spending produces important crowding-out 
effects, by negatively affecting both private consumption and investment. The empirical 
evidence also suggests that neither the prediction of the standard RBC model nor the 
one of IS-LM model can be taken overall as valid. In fact, our results are in contrast 
with the RBC prediction of a rise in investment and with the IS-LM prediction of a rise 
in consumption. 
In addition, we analyze possible asymmetries of the effect of government 
consumption on private consumption and investment. In particular, we test: i) whether 
the effect varies among regions; and ii) whether it depends on to the phase of the 
economic cycle. We find that the effect varies substantially among regions, but it does 
not seem to depend on the phase of the economic cycle.  
We show that all results are economically and statistically significant, and robust 
to several econometric techniques.  
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Section two describes the data. 
Section three shows the empirical methodology used to assess the “crowding-out” 
versus the “crowding-in” effects and discusses the major results. Section four provides 
additional robustness results and addresses the existence of potential asymmetries on the 
effect of government consumption on private consumption and investment. Finally, 
Section five concludes with the main findings and suggestions for further research. 
 
II. DATA 
This section provides a summary description of the data employed in the 
empirical analysis. 
                                                 
1
 Atukeren (2005) also analyzes the issue of crowding-out effects but from a different perspective in that 
the author looks at the linkages between public and private investments and emphasizes the role of the 
share of government involvement in the economy. Similarly, Gonzalez-Paramo and De Cos (2005) finds 
that public ownership negatively affects productivity, while privatization has a positive effect on 
efficiency. 
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The data cover 145 countries and are obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators for the time period 1960-2007. 
We consider annual data for GDP, private consumption, private investment and 
government spending. Due to data availability (both in terms of time and country 
dimension), we decided to proxy private investment and government spending by using 
gross fixed capital formation and public consumption (which represents the largest 
share of total government spending), respectively. All variables are expressed in real per 
capita terms, where we use the GDP deflator to convert nominal in real constant terms. 
The focus of the analysis is on the existence of “crowding-in” versus “crowding-
out” effects of government spending. Consequently, we study the impact of changes in 
the ratio of government spending to GDP on the growth of real per capita private 
consumption and private investment. 
Table A in the Appendix provides the list of the countries used in the study and 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the above-mentioned variables. We can 
see that the private sector is a very important component of GDP: private consumption 
represents almost two thirds (68.22%) of GDP, while the ratio of private investment to 
GDP corresponds to an average of 21.55%. By its turn, government consumption 
represents 15.47% of GDP. 
Over the overall sample, real per capita private consumption grew at an annual 
rate of 1.34% while the growth rate of private investment was 0.72%. Despite the lower 
growth rate, private investment exhibited a much larger volatility as expressed by the 
standard deviation. The change in government spending in percentage of GDP was 
negative (-0.02). 
Finally, Table 3 summarizes the correlation coefficients between the growth rate 
of private consumption, the growth rate of private investment and the change in the ratio 
of government spending to GDP. It shows that although private consumption and 
private investment are positively correlated, their correlations with government 
spending are negative and small. 
  
III. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
We analyze the relationship between private consumption growth and the 
change in the ratio of government spending to GDP, and estimate a model similar to the 
empirical specification used in Romer and Romer (2007) to estimate the impact of tax 
changes on economic activity: 
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 We also look at the impact of a change in the government spending to GDP ratio 
on private investment growth by estimating the following model: 
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In the above specifications, C represents private consumption, I is the private 
investment, Y is the GDP, the  ’s are parameters to be estimated, i is indexing over 
countries and t over time,   and   represent country- and time-specific effects,   is 
the first difference operator, J is the number of lags (set equal to four), and   is the 
error term. 
Panel A and Panel B in Table 4 present the results for the estimation of, 
respectively, equations (1) and (2). The columns of the tables show the results obtained 
using different econometric specifications, namely: i) OLS with time fixed effects; ii) 
OLS with country fixed effects; iii) OLS with both country and time fixed effects; and 
iv) country Random effects estimator. 
Starting with the analysis of the effect of government consumption on private 
consumption (Panel A), we can immediately see that it is negative and statistically 
significant. The results also suggest that not only contemporaneous changes in the 
government consumption-GDP ratio matter, but also its past lags (specifically, the 2
nd
 
and 3
rd
 ones). In particular, the cumulative effect of government spending on private 
consumption is about 1.9 %, of which about 1.2% captured by contemporaneous 
changes in the government consumption-GDP ratio and 0.7 % by its lags. This result 
can be interpreted as follows: an increase of government consumption by 1 % of real 
GDP immediately reduces consumption by approximately 1.2%, with the decline 
continuing for about four years when the cumulative decrease in consumption has 
reached approximately 1.9 %. The result is broadly robust to both country and time 
effects, and both to Fixed and Random effects specification.  
In Panel B, we report the results obtained estimating the investment equation (2). 
Similarly to what we obtained for private consumption, both current and lagged changes 
in government consumption-GDP ratio have a negative and significant effect on private 
investment, with a cumulative effect of approximately 1.8%. The main difference 
between the effect on consumption and investment is that, while contemporaneous 
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change in the government consumption-GDP ratio seems to have a bigger effect on 
consumption, lagged changes are more detrimental for investment. 
 
      IV. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS AND ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS  
4.1 Exogeneity 
Since our measure of the change in the ratio of government spending to GDP 
may not be completely exogenous, there is the risk that the estimated  ’s  in models (1) 
and (2) are biased (and inconsistent). 
A first attempt to address this issue is carried out by eliminating the 
contemporaneous change in the ratio of government spending to GDP in models (1) and 
(2). In fact, since both the growth rate of consumption (and investment) and our 
independent variable are (for the vast majority of the countries in the sample) stationary 
and not persistent, we should expect that the lagged values of our independent variables 
are not influenced by the current value of consumption (and investment) growth rates.  
Following this approach, we revise models (1) and (2) to: 
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respectively, thereby simply excluding the contemporaneous change in the ratio of 
government spending to GDP from the original equations. Due to space constraints, in 
Table 5, we only report the estimated sums of the  ’s obtained with this analysis, and 
we compare them with the ones obtained previously (Table 5). Looking at the table, we 
can still see that government consumption crowds-out both private consumption and 
investment. However, as already pointed out in the previous section, the cumulative 
effect of lags of changes in government consumption-GDP ratio (Panel B) is lower than 
the one due to contemporaneous changes (Panel A). In particular, the cumulative effect 
of (lagged) changes in government consumption-GDP ratio on private consumption 
(investment) is approximately 0.10% (0.35%).  
 A second attempt to correct for possible endogeneity problems is carried out by 
using the GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The results reported 
in the table clearly show that the estimated impact of government spending on both 
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private consumption and investment is qualitatively (in terms of sign) and quantitatively 
(in terms of magnitude) unchanged.  
 
4.2 Serial correlation 
Another possible problem with specifications (1) and (2) is the presence of serial 
correlations. To tackle this issue, we modify models (1) and (2) to: 
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where we add lags of the dependent variables to the set of explanatory variables, so that 
 ’s are parameters to be estimated. 
The results (Table 5, Panel C) confirm the robustness of the previous findings 
and, therefore, suggest that our original specifications do not suffer from serial 
correlation.. 
 
4.3 Identification problem 
We repeat our empirical exercise using the changes in the deficit-GDP ratio as 
an additional control: 
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The inclusion of this variable allows us to control for a possible misspecification 
of the model. In fact, to the extent that changes in government revenue and spending are 
correlated, our results could be capturing the effect of tax changes on the economic 
activity. For instance, Cebula (1978) emphasizes the importance of the government size 
in producing crowding-out effects. Thus, the inclusion of the deficit allows us to 
overcome this identification problem. 
This approach has, however, a potential caveat: if changes in government 
revenue and spending are not correlated, then changes in government spending may be 
correlated with changes in deficit which would lead to multicollinearity problems. 
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The results are reported in Panel D of Table 5 and once again confirm the 
existence of crowding-out effects.
2
 
 
4.4 Asymmetric regional effects 
 The analysis presented so far has shown robust evidence on the existence of 
crowing-out effects. But is the effect similar for different regions and countries? To 
answer this question, we replicate the estimations for specific geographical areas and 
countries. Table 6 presents the results for eight different areas: i) Africa, ii) Asia and 
Pacific, iii) Europe, iv) Middle-East, v) North America, vi) South America and West 
Indies, vii) OECD, and viii) Developing Countries. 
We find that the effect varies substantially between areas. In particular, while 
there are statistically significant crowding-out effects in Africa, Europe and South 
America, government spending does not seem to have (statically) significant affects in 
the other areas considered. 
 We also assess whether the effect is different between developed (OECD) and 
developing countries. The results suggest that the impact of government spending on 
both private consumption and investment is more detrimental in the OECD group. 
However, also among OECD countries there seems to be some degree of heterogeneity. 
In fact, analyzing the results in Table 7, it emerges that the “crowding-out” effects of 
government consumption are largest in relatively less developed countries (such as 
Mexico and Turkey) and in those countries with a high share of government spending 
(such as Finland, Sweden and Norway). 
 
4.5 Asymmetric effects over the business cycle 
 The effect of government spending on economic activity may also differ 
between different phases of the economic cycles (Perotti, 2004). To address this issue, 
we now look at the effects of government spending on the private sector conditioning on 
the information about the business cycle. To be more specific, we construct the 
following dummy variables: og = 1 if og>0, and 0 otherwise and og =1 if og<0, and 0 
otherwise, where og is a measure of output gap, constructed as the difference between 
our series and its trend (computed using the HP filter with a smoothness parameter 
equal to 6.25 as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig,2002). 
                                                 
2
 The absence of statistically significance of the estimated coefficients in the investment equation is due 
to the high correlation (0.15 for the entire sample) between our explanatory variables. 
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Then, we interact the dummy variables with the change in the ratio of 
government spending to GDP, that is, we estimate the following models: 
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where j  and 

j  measure the effect of government spending during upturns and 
downturns, respectively. Table 8 summarizes the results and shows that the effect of 
government spending on both private consumption and investment does not 
significantly vary according to different phases of the cycles.
3
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We contribute to the empirical literature on the effect of government spending 
on economic activity, by assessing the impact of changes in government spending-GDP 
ratio on (the short-term growth rates) of private consumption and investment. We do 
this by analysing a panel sample of 145 countries from 1960 to 2007.  
The results of our paper suggest that government spending produces important 
crowding-out effects, by negatively affecting both private consumption and investment. 
Consequently, the predictions of both the standard RBC and IS-LM models cannot be 
taken overall as valid: our results are in contrast with the RBC prediction of a rise in 
investment, and with the IS-LM prediction of a rise in consumption. 
We find that the cumulative effect of government spending on private 
consumption (investment) is about 1.9 % (1.8 %), of which about 1.2 % (0.6 %) is 
captured by the contemporaneous change in the government consumption-GDP ratio 
and 0.7% (1.2%) by its lags. This result is interpreted as follows: an increase of 
government consumption by 1% of real GDP immediately reduces consumption 
(investment) by approximately 1.2% (0.6%), with the decline continuing for about four 
years when the cumulative decrease in consumption has reached approximately 1.9% 
(1.8%). The result is broadly robust to both country and time effects, and different 
econometric specifications. 
                                                 
3
 The results are quantitavely unchanged if we use the average growth rate as the measure of trend instead 
of the HP trend. 
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 In addition, we show that the effect of government consumption on private 
consumption and investment does not depend on the phase of the business cycle, but 
differ substantially among regions.  
 The differentiated effects of government consumption on private consumption 
and investment among geographical areas are extremely important and need to be 
further investigated. In particular, it would be interesting to assess to which extent the 
effect of government spending on consumption and investment depends on political and 
institutional variables (e.g. democracy, corruption, political stability) as well as macro 
economic variables (income, interest rates, degree of openness). We leave this 
challenging avenue for future research. 
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Table 1. References. 
Authors (Year) Methodology Country Effect on 
Consumption 
Effect on 
Investment 
 
Afonso and Sousa (2011a) VAR US, UK, 
Germany and 
Italy 
Not significant Negative 
Afonso and Sousa (2011b) VAR Portugal Negative Negative 
Argimón et al.(1997) Panel OECD  Positive 
Aschauer (1989) Time series US - Positive 
Barro (1991) Cross-country Developed and 
Developing 
countries 
- Negative 
Biau and Girard (2005) VAR France Positive Positive 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) VAR US Positive Positive 
Burnside et al. (2004) Narrative US Not significant Positive 
Coenen and Straub (2005) VAR Euro area Negative - 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) Time series and 
cross country 
US, and  
Developed and 
Developing 
countries 
- Positive 
Edelberget al. (1999) Narrative Approach US Negative Positive 
Erenburg (1993) Time Series US - Positive 
Erenburg and Wohar (1995) Time Series US - Positive 
Fatás and Mihov (2001) VAR US Positive Not significant 
Giordano et al. (2007)  VAR Italy Positive Positive 
Grier and Tullock (1989) Cross-country Developed and 
Developing 
countries 
- Positive 
Hepke-Falk et al. (2006) VAR Germany Positive Positive 
Karras (1994) Time Series Developed and 
Developing 
countries 
Positive  
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) VAR US Not Significant Negative 
Perotti (2004) VAR Australia, 
Canada, Germany 
and UK 
Positive Not significant 
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) Narrative Approach US Negative - 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics. 
Variable # Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Private Consumption 
(% of GDP) 5023 68.22 16.76 
Private Investment (% 
of GDP) 4472 21.55 8.78 
Government Spending 
(% of GDP) 5014 15.47 6.34 
    
Private Consumption 
Growth 4870 1.34 8.06 
Private Investment 
Growth 4322 0.72 21.62 
    
Change in Government 
Spending (% of GDP) 5014 -0.02 1.62 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation Coefficients. 
Variable 
Private 
Consumption 
(% of GDP) 
Private 
Investment (% of 
GDP) 
Change in 
Government 
Spending (% of 
GDP) 
Private Consumption 
(% of GDP) 1   
Private Investment 
(% of GDP) 0.25 1  
Change in 
Government 
Spending (% of 
GDP) -0.23 -0.07 1 
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Table 4. Effects of Government Spending on Private Consumption and Investment Growth – Baseline Model. 
 Panel A. Consumption Panel B. Investment 
 OLS OLS OLS FE RE OLS OLS OLS FE RE 







t
t
Y
G
 
-1.25*** 
(0.16) 
-1.23*** 
(0.17) 
-1.24*** 
(0.17) 
-1.23*** 
(0.07) 
-1.24*** 
(0.07) 
-0.59** 
(0.30) 
-0.62** 
(0.33) 
-0.61** 
(0.32) 
-0.62*** 
(0.20) 
-0.61*** 
(0.19) 









1
1
t
t
Y
G
 
-0.11 
(0.12) 
-0.10 
(0.12) 
-0.11 
(0.13) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
-0.12* 
(0.07) 
-0.38 
(0.31) 
-0.43 
(0.32) 
-0.42 
(0.33) 
-0.43** 
(0.20) 
-0.40** 
(0.20) 









2
2
t
t
Y
G
 
-0.27** 
(0.11) 
-0.24** 
(0.12) 
-0.26** 
(0.13) 
-0.24*** 
(0.07) 
-0.25*** 
(0.07) 
-0.48** 
(0.23) 
-0.57** 
(0.24) 
-0.53** 
(0.24) 
-0.57*** 
(0.19) 
-0.53*** 
(0.19) 









3
3
t
t
Y
G
 
-0.17* 
(0.11) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
-0.17* 
(0.11) 
-0.15** 
(0.07) 
-0.16** 
(0.11) 
-0.39** 
(0.22) 
-0.49** 
(0.22) 
-0.46** 
(0.22) 
-0.49*** 
(0.19) 
-0.43*** 
(0.19) 









4
4
t
t
Y
G
 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.21) 
-0.13 
(0.23) 
-0.11 
(0.23) 
-0.13 
(0.19) 
-0.07 
(0.18) 
           
Time FE Yes No Yes   Yes No Yes   
Country 
FE 
No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes   
R
2
 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.01 
Notes: “OLS” denotes Ordinary Least Squares, “RE” refers to Random Effects.  Estimated standard errors in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels. 
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Table 5. Effects of Government Spending on Private Consumption and Investment Growth - Robustness Checks. 
 Consumption Investment 
 OLS 
Time FE 
OLS 
Country 
FE 
OLS 
Time-  
Country 
FE 
FE RE GMM OLS 
Time FE 
OLS 
Country 
FE 
OLS 
Time & 
Country 
FE 
FE RE GMM 
Panel A. Baseline 

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G
 
-0.38*** 
(0.06) 
-0.36*** 
(0.06) 
-0.38*** 
(0.06) 
-0.36*** 
(0.04) 
-0.37*** 
(0.03) 
-0.41*** 
(0.06) 
-0.37*** 
(0.12) 
-0.44*** 
(0.14) 
-0.42*** 
(0.15) 
-0.44*** 
(0.10) 
-0.40*** 
(0.10) 
-0.45*** 
(0.12) 
R
2
 
0.06 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.03  0.04 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.01  
Panel B. Exogeneity 

 










4
1 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G  -0.12** 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.11*** 
(0.04) 
-0.10* 
(0.06) 
-0.29*** 
(0.13) 
-0.37*** 
(0.14) 
-0.34*** 
(0.15) 
-0.37*** 
(0.10) 
-0.34*** 
(0.10) 
-0.36** 
(0.15) 
R
2
 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.00  0.03 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00  
Panel C. Serial Correlation 

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G  -0.41** 
(0.06) 
-0.39** 
(0.06) 
-0.41** 
(0.06) 
-0.39** 
(0.03) 
-0.40** 
(0.03) 
 -0.36*** 
(0.13) 
-0.36*** 
(0.13) 
-0.36*** 
(0.13) 
-0.36*** 
(0.13) 
-0.36*** 
(0.13) 
 
R
2
 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.04 0.04  0.03 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.01  
Panel D. Identification 

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G
 
-0.34** 
(0.08) 
-0.35** 
(0.09) 
-0.36** 
(0.09) 
-0.35** 
(0.05) 
-0.35** 
(0.10) 
 -0.15 
(0.19) 
-0.16 
(0.23) 
-0.17 
(0.23) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
 
R
2
 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.03 0.03  0.03 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.01  
Notes: “OLS” denotes Ordinary Least Squares, “RE” refers to Random Effects, “GMM” denotes Generalized Method of Moments. Estimation method Blundell-Bond (1998). Estimated 
standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. Baseline refers to models (1) and (2). Exogeneity refers to models 
(3) and (4) where only lagged growth rates of government consumption are consideor+ed; Serial correlation refers to models (5) and (6), where lagged growth rates of the dependent 
variables are included; Identification refers to model (7) and (8) where current and lagged growth rates of the budget deficit are included. 
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Table 6. Effects of Government Spending on Private Consumption and Investment Growth - Asymmetric Regional Effects. 
 Africa Asia and 
Pacific 
Europe Middle East  North 
America 
South 
America and 
West Indies 
OECD Developing 
countries 
Panel A. Consumption 
 

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G
 
-0.36*** 
(0.06) 
-0.13 
(0.16) 
-0.39*** 
(0.17) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
-0.09 
(0.24) 
-0.66*** 
(0.15) 
-0.59*** 
(0.07) 
-0.37*** 
(0.06) 
R
2
 
0.09 0.20 0.25 0.24 0.49 0.17 0.27 0.11 
Panel B. Investment 
 

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G
 
-0.22 
(0.22) 
-0.52 
(0.44) 
-0.49*** 
(0.23) 
0.22 
(0.37) 
-0.74 
(0.61) 
-0.91*** 
(0.28) 
-1.50*** 
(0.20) 
-0.37*** 
(0.15) 
R
2
 
0.08 0.19 0.18 0.29 0.52 0.18 0.22 0.08 
Notes: We estimate the model using “OLS” denotes Ordinary Least Squares and including both country and time effects.  Estimated standard errors in parentheses.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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Table 7.  
Panel A. Effects of Government Spending on Private Consumption Growth - 
Asymmetries Across Countries. 
 
  Australia          Austria          Belgium          Canada          Czech          Denmark          Finland 
                                                Republic    

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G
      -0.81*           -0.63    -0.59***          -0.44**       -0.25              -0.14         -0.97** 
       (0.45)           (0.44)     (0.17)               (0.18)       (0.48)             (0.70)          (0.38) 
 
 
R
2
                0.17            0.08      0.26                0.26        0.05   0.01           0.28 
 
 
  France         Germany        Greece            Hungary        Ireland              Italy              Japan 
                                                                              

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G
     -0.37**        -0.71***     -0.37               -0.94       -0.31  -0.26        -0.99*** 
        (0.17)           (0.17)     (0.32)               (0.60)       (0.21)  (0.23)         (0.16) 
 
 
R
2
                0.19             0.30      0.04                0.19        0.13    0.03          0.58 
 
 
 Korea     Luxembourg   Mexico        New Zealand    Norway           Poland          Portugal      
                                                                              

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G
    -1.00           -0.33    -3.11***          -1.36***        -0.21 -0.43**         -0.36 
      (0.84)          (0.59)     (0.98)               (0.40)        (0.29)             (0.17)         (0.53) 
 
 
R
2
               0.25            0.02      0.27                0.43         0.101   0.18          0.02 
 
 
   Slovak          Spain   Sweden       Switzerland       Turkey            United           United     
                        Republic                                                          Kingdom         States                        

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G
      -0.27           -0.81**   -0.76***        -1.03***     -3.46**          -0.68***          -0.11 
        (0.31)          (0.37)    (0.18)            (0.25)      (1.23)             (0.23)          (0.18) 
 
 
R
2
                0.03            0.21     0.49             0.40       0.32  0.27           0.01 
                               
Notes: We estimate the model using “OLS” denotes Ordinary Least Squares and including both country and time 
effects.  Estimated standard errors in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% significance levels. 
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Table 7.  
Panel B. Effects of Government Spending on Private Investment Growth - 
Asymmetries Across Countries. 
            
  Australia          Austria          Belgium          Canada          Czech          Denmark          Finland 
                                                Republic    

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G
      -1.66           -0.30      -0.86              -1.56***       -0.66               -1.23         -3.95*** 
       (1.39)           (1.05)     (1.19)               (0.56)       (0.88)              (1.38)          (1.17) 
 
 
R
2
                0.03            0.00      0.03                0.29        0.05    0.06           0.41 
 
 
  France         Germany        Greece            Hungary        Ireland              Italy              Japan 
                                                                              

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G
      -0.92           -1.40***      0.88               -1.21       -0.13 -0.70**        -2.56*** 
        (0.66)           (0.46)     (1.13)               (0.73)       (0.66)  (0.36)         (0.73) 
 
 
R
2
                0.10             0.15       0.03                0.12       0.00    0.04          0.36 
 
 
Korea     Luxembourg   Mexico        New Zealand    Norway           Poland          Portugal      
                                                                              

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G
   -2.67*         -1.00     -5.75*              -3.01       -1.91*  -0.22         -0.96 
     (1.57)          (3.24)     (2.85)               (2.23)       (1.06)              (1.21)         (1.62) 
 
 
R
2
              0.10            0.01      0.15                0.13        0.13    0.00          0.02 
 
 
   Slovak          Spain   Sweden       Switzerland       Turkey            United           United     
                        Republic                                                          Kingdom         States                        

 










4
0 ,
,
j jti
jti
Y
G
      -1.08           -2.23*   -2.19**            -1.88    -11.84**          -1.28**       -1.86*** 
        (1.12)          (1.20)    (0.87)             (1.88)      (4.50)             (0.59)         (0.53) 
 
 
R
2
                0.02            0.18     0.36              0.07       0.34  0.16           0.25 
                 
Notes: We estimate the model using “OLS” denotes Ordinary Least Squares and including both country and time 
effects.  Estimated standard errors in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% significance levels. 
  
21 
Table 8. Effects of Government Spending on Private Consumption and Investment Growth - Asymmetric Effects Over the Business Cycle. 
 Panel A. Consumption Panel B. Investment 
 OLS OLS OLS FE RE OLS OLS OLS FE RE 

 

 






 og
Y
G
j jti
jti
4
0 ,
,
 
-0.41*** 
(0.08) 
-0.39*** 
(0.08) 
-0.40*** 
(0.08) 
-0.39*** 
(0.05) 
-0.41*** 
(0.05) 
-0.38** 
(0.17) 
-0.47** 
(0.33) 
-0.43** 
(0.19) 
-0.47*** 
(0.13) 
-0.43*** 
(0.12) 

 

 






 og
Y
G
j jti
jti
4
0 ,
,
 
-0.35** 
(0.08) 
-0.33** 
(0.08) 
-0.35** 
(0.08) 
-0.33** 
(0.05) 
-0.33** 
(0.05) 
-0.35** 
(0.14) 
-0.41** 
(0.19) 
-0.40** 
(0.19) 
-0.41*** 
(0.14) 
-0.37** 
(0.13) 
           
Time FE Yes No Yes   Yes No Yes   
Country FE No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes   
R
2
 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.01 




 
J
j
j
J
j
j
00
  
(p-value) 
(0.64) (0.57) (0.75) (0.33) (0.24) (0.89) (0.79) (0.91) (0.73) (0.72) 
Notes: “OLS” denotes Ordinary Least Squares, “RE” refers to Random Effects.  Estimated standard errors in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels. og
+
 =1 during upturns, and zero otherwise; og
-
 =1 during downturns, and zero otherwise.  
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Appendix.  
Table A. Country Sample. 
 
 
                                                                                             Country list 
Albania Croatia Jordan Portugal Uruguay 
Algeria Cyprus Kazakhstan Puerto Rico Venezuela 
Artigua and Barbuda Czech Republic Kenya Romania Yemen 
Argentina Denmark Korea Russian Federation Zambia 
Armenia Djibouti Kyrgyz Republic Rwanda Zimbabwe 
Australia Dominica Latvia Sao Tome e Principe  
Austria Dominican Republic Lesotho Senegal  
Azerbaijan Ecuador Luxembourg Seychelles  
Bahamas Egypt Macao Sierra Leone  
Bangladesh El Salvador Macedonia Slovak Republic  
Barbados Estonia Madagascar Slovenia  
Belarus Ethiopia Malawi Solomon Islands  
Belgium Finland Malaysia Somalia  
Belize France Mali South Africa  
Benin Gabon Malta Spain  
Bhutan Gambia Mauritania Sri Lanka  
Bolivia Germany Mauritius St. Kitts and Nevis  
Botswana Ghana Mexico St. Vincent and the Grenadines  
Brazil Greece Moldova Sudan  
Brunei Darussalam Grenada Morocco Swaziland  
Bulgaria Guatemala Mozambique Sweden  
Burkina Faso Guinea Namibia Switzerland  
Cambodia Guinea-Bissau Netherlands Syrian Arab Republic  
Cameroon Guyana New Zealand Tajikistan  
Canada Haiti Nicaragua Tanzania  
Cape Verde Honduras Niger Thailand  
Chad Hong Kong Nigeria Togo  
Chile Hungary Norway Trinidad and Tobago  
China Iceland Pakistan Tunisia  
Colombia India Panama Turkey  
Comoros Indonesia Papua New Guinea Uganda  
Congo, Dem. Rep. Iran Paraguay Ukraine  
Congo, Rep. Ireland Peru United Arab Emirates  
Costa Rica Italy Philippines United Kingdom  
Côte d’Ivoire Japan Poland United States of America  
